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THE NEW ARBITRARINESS: PROCEDURAL
DEFAULT OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
CLAIMS IN CAPITAL CASES
Timothy J Foley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Habeas corpus, "the most celebrated writ in the English law,"1 has
long enjoyed "extraordinary prestige" in the Anglo-American system of
justice.2 For hundreds of years, the right to petition the judiciary for
freedom from unjust confinement, based upon the presumption that the
government must always be prepared to set forth and defend the reasons
for that confinement, has been steadfastly maintained and defended.
3
In spite of its historical prominence, the operation of federal habeas
jurisdiction, especially over the claims of state prisoners,4 has been
marked with ongoing controversy.' The review of state detentions
through a federal habeas proceeding is alternatively embraced as a vindi-
* Staff Attorney, California Appellate Project, San Francisco. B.S., Santa Clara Univer-
sity, 1980; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1983. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the
position of the California Appellate Project.
1. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129; see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400
(1963).
2. Fay, 372 U.S. at 399.
3. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-92 (1969); Fay, 372 U.S. at 399414; Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963); see generally R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 3-27
(2d ed. 1969); Chafee, The Most Important Human Right In The Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REv.
143 (1952); Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern Writ-I, 18
CAN. B. REv. 10 (1940).
4. The common law writ was embraced by the framers in Article I, section 9 of the
Constitution, as well as the Judiciary Act of 1789. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-1631 (1982)); R. SOKOL,
supra note 3, at 15-17. See generally W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUS 127-40 (1980). In 1867, Congress specifically authorized federal habeas jurisdiction
over state prisoners. Act approved February 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982)). See also R. SOKOL, supra note 3, at 18.
5. See R. SOKOL, supra note 3, at 19-21; see also J. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5-24 (1988); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collat-
eral Attack On Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970); Robbins, Whither (or
Wither) Habeas Corpus?: Observations on the Supreme Court's 1985 Term, 111 F.R.D. 265,
299-301 (1986). The disagreements over the purpose, scope and use of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction are apparent from the sharply competing views expressed throughout the years in
the Court's opinions. Compare Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1072-74 (1989) (plurality
opinion) with id. at 1084 (Brennan, J., dissenting); compare Fay, 372 U.S. at 407-14 with id. at
448-70 (Harlan, J., dissenting); compare Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-92 (1923) with id.
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cation of essential liberties, sweeping aside procedural impediments and
curing injustice,6 or criticized as an encroachment on state court integ-
rity preventing finality and clogging federal dockets.7
Nowhere is this controversy more acute than in the death penalty
arena. On the one hand, federal habeas review of state death sentences
has been crucial to the vindication of fundamental constitutional rights.
The rate of reversal of death judgments has been very high,8 and this
federal intervention has clearly prevented the execution of many individ-
uals who were sentenced to death in violation of the Constitution.9 On
the other hand, with increasing political pressure from states with high
death row populations, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction has been at-
tacked as an unwarranted, frustrating impediment to swift and sure jus-
tice.10 No less an authority than the current Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States has bemoaned the "mockery of our
criminal justice system" resulting from the time-consuming review
caused by the habeas petitions of the capitally sentenced.11 With no fore-
at 93 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); compare Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326-31 (1915)
with id. at 346-50 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6. See, eg., Frank, 237 U.S. at 346-47 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Coleman v. Mc-
Cormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1294 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J., concurring); W. DUKER, supra
note 4, at 6-7; Lay, Problems of Federal Habeas Corpus Involving State Prisoners, 45 F.R.D. 45,
47-48 (1968).
7. See, eg., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475-77 (1976); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 451 (1963); Friendly,
supra note 5, at 148-51; see generally OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY
GENERAL ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE COURT JUDGMENTS (1988)
[hereinafter REPORT].
8. Between 1976 and 1983, approximately 70% of federal habeas corpus petitions in capi-
tal cases resulted in guilt or sentence reversals. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915
(1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punish-
ment, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1670, 1671-72 (1986). Since 1983, the parameters of the constitu-
tional limitations on death sentencing have continued to evolve, and the pronouncements of
the high court in cases such as Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (instructions may not
limit sentencer's ability to consider any evidence put forward to mitigate penalty), Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (defendant has a right to present evidence of past good
behavior and probable future good behavior while incarcerated to mitigate potential death
sentence), and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (impermissible to lead sentencer to
believe others have responsibility for defendant's death) have resulted in a high number of
reversals.
9. See, eg., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 436 (1972). In addition, the reversals
achieved in federal habeas corpus proceedings almost certainly saved innocent defendants from
execution. See Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 21 (1987).
10. REPORT, supra note 7, at 37-38, 83-90; Powell, Review of Capital Convictions Isn't
Working, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1988, at 10, 12-13.
11. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari). Otherjustices have expressed similar concerns about the delay of executions and
the potential loss in public confidence in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Darden v.
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seeable abatement in the number of state-court death judgments and the
consequent "enormous and taxing death penalty workload that looms on
the horizon" for the federal courts,12 the controversy will no doubt
continue.
The Rehnquist Court, building upon a foundation left by the War-
ren/Burger Courts, has continued to construct procedural barriers to the
assertion of claims of constitutional violations presented in federal habeas
actions. These hurdles include a restricted review of fourth amendment
claims,13 impediments to successive petitions,14 a stricter adherence to
the exhaustion requirement, 5 and a possible retroactivity bar. 6 The
most problematic and confusing procedural hurdle, however, was first
imposed in Wainwright v. Sykes: 7 the use of the adequate and independ-
ent state grounds doctrine to restrict federal habeas review of a constitu-
tional claim where a state court had defaulted the claim on a procedural
ground. 18
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 187-88 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Powell, supra note 10, at
12-13.
12. McCormick, 874 F.2d at 1297 (Trott, J., concurring); see also id. at 1296 (Reinhardt,
J., concurring).
13. In Stone v. Powell, the Court announced that federal habeas corpus relief is not avail-
able for a claim that evidence was admitted at trial in violation of the fourth amendment unless
the state court denied an opportunity for a full and adequate hearing on the fourth amendment
claim. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). Thus, under the "opportunity" approach, an exclusionary
rule challenge has two requirements: (1) The evidence has to have been admitted in violation
of the fourth amendment; and (2) the state court denied a full opportunity to litigate this
claim. Id. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375-77 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell,
443 U.S. 545, 559-64 (1979). The Stone holding seems to be derived more from a hostility to
the exclusionary rule than any established limitation on habeas power. See Batey, Federal
Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: 'Finality with a Capital F," 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 252,
257-62 (1984); see generally Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule
After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1982).
14. In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of the Court, favored
equating the "ends of justice" exception to the prohibition against same-claim successor peti-
tions, codified in Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases, with a "colorable claim of
factual innocence." 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986). The adoption of such a standard would restrict
the scope of the ends ofjustice analysis tendered in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, at 428-30.
15. In Rose v. Lundy, the Court expressed the opinion that "mixed" petitions, containing
both exhausted and unexhausted claims, should be dismissed. 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). See
also Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1989) (Alarcon, J., concurring).
16. In Teague v. Lane, Justice O'Connor, writing for a four-Justice plurality, favored the
adoption of a retroactivity threshold requirement in all habeas cases. 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1069-70
(1989). Such an approach would generally deny relief on any habeas claim grounded in "new
law." Id. at 1069-72. See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2944 (1989).
17. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
18. Id. at 89-90; see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478 (1986).
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This Article will discuss the use and effect of procedural default
standards in capital cases and suggest that the Sykes approach has not
only failed to promote its purported goals, but has introduced a dis-
turbing new layer of arbitrariness into a system that is already producing
inconsistent results. 19 The discussion will first briefly review the origin
and parameters of the Sykes approach. Second, the application of the
doctrine in two capital cases will be examined. The discussion will then
move to a general assessment of the adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine in capital habeas proceedings.
II. WAINWRIGHT V SYKES: ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE
GROUNDS AS A RESTRICTION ON HABEAS POWER
In Fay v. Noia,2 ° the Supreme Court held that federal courts could,
in the context of federal habeas proceedings, grant relief despite an appli-
cant's procedural default of the challenge in state court proceedings. 21
Rejecting the argument that the forfeiture of a constitutional challenge
under a state court procedural rule should restrict the reach of the fed-
eral court's power, the Court in Fay concluded: "[T]he doctrine under
which state procedural defaults are held to constitute an adequate and
independent state law ground" to preserve a petitioner's confinement "is
not to be extended to limit the power granted the federal courts under
the federal habeas statute."'22 However, because of considerations of
comity and federalism, the federal courts could decline to exercise their
discretion to review a claim if the applicant had "deliberately by-passed
the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing.., forfeited his
state court remedies."'23 The Court set aside petitioner Noia's conviction
despite the fact that Noia had failed to appeal his conviction in state
court and the state court had defaulted the claim. 24
19. The overall inequities of the capital punishment system in the United States have been
extensively catalogued. See, eg., B. NAKELL & K. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE
DEATH PENALTY (1987); Greenberg, supra note 8; Hubbard, Reasonable Levels of Arbitrarl-
ness in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 1113 (1985); Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition
of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797 (1986).
20. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
21. Id. at 398-99.
22. Id. at 399.
23. Id. at 438. The deliberate bypass concept is the analogue to the knowing and intelli-
gent waiver rule of Johnson v. Zerbst. Fay, 372 U.S. at 439 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938)). Such an approach reflects the view that a defendant should not lose a funda-
mental right, either substantive or procedural, unless the defendant knowingly chooses to
forego the exercise of that right. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 524 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
24. Fay, 372 U.S. at 426-34. The Court reversed the conviction after finding that Noia's
[Vol. 23:193
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Fourteen years later, in Wainwright v. Sykes,25 the Court rejected
the deliberate-bypass standard and broad language of Fay, noting that it
had an "historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views" re-
garding federal habeas corpus.26 Sykes held that the adequate and in-
dependent state grounds doctrine should be applied in the federal habeas
arena and that a state procedural default would generally bar federal re-
view unless the petitioner could show "cause" for the failure to comply
with the state procedural rule and also show actual "prejudice." 27
Sykes, which enforced a contemporaneous-objection rule that the
state court had invoked to bar relief,28 rejected the "sweeping lan-
guage"29 of Fay because it failed to grant sufficient deference to the un-
derlying purposes of state forfeiture rules, encouraged defense lawyers to
"sandbag" claims, and detracted from the perception of the trial as the
decisive event in the criminal adjudication.30 In discussing the Sykes ap-
proach in later opinions, the Court has generally invoked the need for
finality,3 respect for state court adjudication of the claims,32 and the so-
cial cost of overturning criminal convictions33 as the rationales underly-
ing this restriction on federal habeas relief.
confession had been coerced. Id. Noia's post-conviction petition in state court had been de-
nied on the procedural ground that he had waived his appellate rights by allowing the time for
appeal to lapse. Id. at 394. Justice Harlan, in dissent, argued that this default was an adequate
and independent state-law basis for Noia's detention and that the federal court should look no
further. Id. at 453-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
26. Id. at 81.
27. Id. at 90-91. The "cause-and-prejudice" standard has its roots in Rule 12(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires certain objections to be made before trial.
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2)). Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States
held that a failure to comply with Rule 12(b) could bar any later objection to certain chal-
lenges to federal criminal proceedings unless a defendant could show "cause" warranting re-
lief. 371 U.S. 341, 362-63 (1963). In addition, in Davis v. United States, the Court held that
the general restriction of review that Rule 12(b)(2) embodies was also applicable to federal
habeas review of federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973). The
Court in Sykes and Francis v. Henderson applied this standard to federal habeas review of the
petitions of state prisoners. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84; Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538-39
(1976).
28. No objection was made at trial to the admissibility of the defendant's inculpatory state-
ments. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 75. Under Florida's rules of criminal procedure, a motion to sup-
press an admission should have been made before trial. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 76 n.5 (citing FLA.
R. CRIM. P. 3.190(i)).
29. Id. at 87-88.
30. Id. at 88-90.
31. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-27
(1982).
32. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 487; Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Engle, 456 U.S. at 128-
29.
33. Engle, 456 U.S. at 127-28; but see id. at 146-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The approach annunciated in Sykes, filtered through subsequent dis-
cussion by the Court,34 requires that the federal courts defer to the ade-
quate and independent state procedural bar except where the petitioner
demonstrates one of two exceptions. In summary, as recently expressed
in Harris v. Reed:
35
Under Sykes and its progeny, an adequate and independent
finding of procedural default will bar federal habeas review of
the federal claim, unless the habeas petitioner can show
"cause" for the default and "prejudice attributable thereto," or
demonstrate that failure to consider the federal claim will result
in a "'fundamental miscarriage of justice.' ,,36
Thus, under the Sykes approach,3 7 a federal court faced with an assertion
of state default must first assess whether the default is an adequate and
independent state ground for the state court's denial of the claim and
then assess whether one of the two exceptions-"cause-and-prejudice" or
"a fundamental miscarriage of justice"-is applicable.
The determination of whether an adequate and independent state
ground exists is by no means easy.38 The inquiry must assess whether the
state default rule exists, whether the denial of relief was actually based on
the state's default rule, and whether that rule represents a consistent and
legitimate exercise of state power.39 The state court must clearly, unam-
34. See generally Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989); Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct.
1038 (1989); Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771 (1988); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986);
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 478; Engle, 456 U.S. at 107.
35. 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989).
36. Id. at 1043 (citation omitted) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986));
see also Amadeo, 108 S. Ct. at 1776; Smith, 477 U.S. at 533; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488.
37. As the Sykes opinion declined to paint with a "broad brush," the Fay analysis still
appears to be valid in some limited areas. See Brownstein v. Director, Illinois Dep't of Correc-
tions, 760 F.2d 836, 839-44 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 858 (1985); Maupin v. Smith, 785
F.2d 135, 138 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986); J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, at 346-50.
38. Professor Robbins recognizes "at least five threshold questions" that must be
addressed:
(1) Does the state indeed have the particular procedural rule that it claims has been
violated, with forfeiture of state review of the claim as a sanction? (2) If so, does the
state procedural rule furnish an adequate and independent state ground for denying
relief? (3) If so, was the procedural rule intended to apply to the facts of this particu-
lar case? (4) If so, did the defendant satisfactorily comply with the rule? (5) If not,
did the state rely on the procedural bar to deny relief?
Robbins, supra note 5, at 294 (citations omitted). Professor Liebman notes the extensive anal-
ysis underlying the adequate and independent state ground inquiry. J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5,
at 335-44. The precedent requires a clearly applicable state rule, the absence of substantial
compliance, the absence of a decision on the merits, an unambiguous procedural ruling and
showing of adequacy. Id. These extensive inquiries must be undertaken before either of the
two exceptions can be addressed. Robbins, supra note 5, at 294.
39. Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138; see generally J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, at 333-44; Robson &
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biguously, and correctly rely on its default rule as the basis for denying
the claim.' Once the independence is established, the federal court must
look to adequacy: whether the state procedural default is a clearly ar-
ticulated and regularly applied rule with its basis in legitimate state inter-
ests41 and whether substantial compliance with the rule should excuse
the technical default.42 Once the default is established as an adequate
and independent ground, the reviewing court then must turn to the two
somewhat ill-defined exceptions: "cause-and-prejudice" and a "miscar-
riage of justice."43
"Cause" has been much discussed in the Court's opinions, but an
explicit definition has yet to emerge. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly
disavowed any set definition for "cause."'  Writing for a slim majority in
Murray v. Carrier,45 Justice O'Connor advised that cause "must ordina-
rily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor
external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the
State's procedural rule."46 Turning to the issue of prejudice, the Court
has held that prejudice must be real, not hypothetical, and involve consti-
tutional errors that worked to the petitioner's "actual and substantial dis-
advantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
Mello, Ariadne's Provisions: A "Clue of Thread" to the Intricacies of Procedural Default, Ade-
quate and Independent State Grounds, and Florida's Death Penalty, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 89, 99-
128 (1988).
40. Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1043; Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985); see also
Bruni v. Lewis, 847 F.2d 561, 562-63 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 403 (1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1319 (1989); Sanders/Miller v. Logan, 710 F.2d 645, 654-55 (10th Cir.
1983); see also J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, at 339-41; Robson & Mello, supra note 39, at 119-29.
41. Johnson v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 1987 (1988); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,
262-63 (1982); Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 843 F.2d 712, 719 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
403 (1988); Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930
(1987); Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458, 1469-70 (11th Cir. 1986).
42. James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 351 (1984); Hathorn, 457 U.S. at 262-63 (1982);
Wheat, 793 F.2d at 624-25; Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138; Spencer, 781 F.2d at 1469-70.
43. Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138-39; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96; Robson & Mello, supra note
39, at 129.
44. See Amadeo, 108 S. Ct. at 1776 (Court has not established "contours" of cause and
prejudice standard); Smith, 477 U.S. at 533-34 ("We have declined in the past to essay a com-
prehensive catalog of the circumstances that would justify a finding of cause."); Reed, 468 U.S.
at 13 ("Because of the... virtually limitless array of contexts in which a procedural default
can occur, this Court has not given the term 'cause' precise content."); Sykes, 433 U.S. at 100
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]oday's decision makes no effort to provide concrete guidance as
to the content of those terms [cause and prejudice].").
45. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
46. Id. at 488. InAmadeo, the Court approved a finding of cause where the factual prereq-
uisite for the grand jury challenger, a district attorney's memorandum instructing the jury
commission to underrepresent blacks and women, was not reasonably discoverable. 108 S. Ct.
at 1776-77. The analysis of whether cause exists appears to be factually specific, with few
general guidelines. See J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, at 350-57.
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dimensions."'47
The second exception, "a fundamental miscarriage of justice" is sim-
ilarly difficult to define precisely. Justice O'Connor has equated this
standard with a showing that the "constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent."48 Obviously,
the "actual innocence" standard is difficult to apply in a capital sentenc-
ing trial context: It is somewhat incongruous to inquire whether a de-
fendant is actually innocent of a death sentence.49
Sykes clearly marked a shift toward restriction of federal habeas
corpus relief and favors finality and expedience. The Sykes approach,
however, is unquestionably difficult to apply. Neither the general rule
nor the exceptions is easily defined or particularly workable. When the
need for heightened scrutiny required in capital cases is introduced into
this analysis, these problems become far more acute.
III. APPLICATION OF THE SYKES APPROACH IN SMITH V. MURRAY
AND DUGGER v. ADAMS
The Court has used the adequate and independent state grounds
doctrine to enforce procedural defaults in two capital cases, Smith v.
Murray5 0 and Dugger v. Adams." Both 'cases used Wainwright v.
Sykes52 to ignore an otherwise valid challenge to a death sentence.
53
Both were five-to-four decisions with pointed dissents and ultimately re-
47. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis omitted); see also Carrier,
477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)); see generally J.
LIEBMAN, supra note 5, at 357-61.
48. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)); see also
Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1218 n.6, 1219 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Professor Liebman has
observed that in a sense, Justice O'Connor's use of an "actual innocence" standard to allow
habeas relief where a procedural bar might otherwise exist amounts to a limited expansion of
habeas corpus jurisdiction. J. LIEBMAN, supra note 5, at 17.
49. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Smith conceded that the actual innocence stan-
dard "does not translate easily" into the context of the review of error at a capital-sentencing-
phase trial. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537. The Court has yet to clarify the law in this area, and
recently declined "to define what it means to be 'actually innocent' of a death sentence."
Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1218 n.6.
50. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
51. 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989). The Court also discussed the Sykes standard in deciding the
capital cases of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 326-28 (1985) (state procedural default
not binding on federal court because it was not relied upon by state court); Amadeo v. Zant,
108 S. Ct. 1771, 1776-77 (1988) (cause established by concealment of evidence by officials);
and Johnson v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 1981 (1988) (state procedural bar not applied consistently
or regularly is insufficient to prevent federal court from reviewing habeas challenge).
52. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
53. Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1213-18; Smith, 477 U.S. at 538-39.
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suited in execution of the petitioners. 54
Smith arose out of a Virginia murder prosecution. Michael Smith
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in the late 1970s.55
During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution introduced the tes-
timony of a court-appointed psychiatrist who had conducted an exami-
nation of Smith without advising him that his statements might be used
against him.56 The psychiatrist, over defendant's objection, testified that
Smith had admitted a prior sexual assault during the interview.57
On appeal, defense counsel raised thirteen issues but did not reallege
the impropriety of the psychiatric testimony, having decided that Vir-
ginia law would not support such a challenge.5 8 The conviction and sen-
tence were affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court in 1978.19 The
following year, a state habeas corpus petition was filed alleging that the
admission of the psychiatric testimony violated the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.60 The Virginia courts defaulted the claim, ruling that the
petitioner had forfeited this ground by failing to raise it on appeal.61
Having exhausted his state remedies, Smith's lawyers turned to the fed-
eral courts and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 2
While the federal petition was being litigated, on May 18, 1981, the
United States Supreme Court overturned the death sentence of a far
more fortunate Mr. Smith in Estelle v. Smith,63 holding that Ernest
Smith's sentence was invalid because the prosecution had introduced the
testimony of a court-appointed psychiatrist who, in violation of the fifth
amendment, relayed information received during an interview with the
defendant where the defendant had not been advised of his constitutional
rights.6' The Smith holding, according to a dissenting Justice Stevens,
54. Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1212 (White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J.,
majority opinion), 1218 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Smith, 477
U.S. at 528 (O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, Powell, JJ. & Burger, C.J., majority opinion), 539
(Stevens, Marshall, Blackmun & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
55. Smith, 477 U.S. at 529-30.
56. Id. at 529. Pursuant to defense counsel's request, the psychiatrist had been appointed
to examine Smith to determine whether there was any psychological basis for a defense. Id.
57. Id. at 529-30.
58. Id. at 531.
59. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978). The objections to the
psychiatric testimony were raised in an amicus curiae brief filed by the Post-Conviction Assist-
ance Project of the University of Virginia Law School, but the state court, pursuant to its rules,
did not consider this challenge. Id. at 460 n.1, 248 S.E.2d at 139 n.1.
60. Smith, 477 U.S. at 531.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 532.
63. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
64. Id. at 462-71.
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made it "absolutely clear" that the psychiatric testimony introduced in
Michael Smith's trial also violated the fifth amendment.6
Nonetheless, in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court
affirmed the denial of Smith's habeas petition, holding that the challenge
to the psychiatric testimony was barred under Sykes.16 Finding the state
court's forfeiture holding an adequate and independent ground to uphold
the death sentence, the Court thought it "self-evident" that "cause" for
the failure to raise the claim in state court had not been established 67 and
further held that the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception did
not apply.68 Making it manifestly clear that Sykes was applicable to
death penalty cases, the majority. "rejected the suggestion that the princi-
ples of Wainwright v. Sykes apply differently depending on the nature of
the penalty.",69 Justice Stevens, joined by three other justices, sharply
dissented.70 On August 1, 1986, Michael Smith was executed in Vir-
ginia's electric chair.71
In Dugger v. Adams,72 the Court again wrestled with the question of
whether an apparently meritorious constitutional challenge to a death
sentence could be ignored because of a state court default.73 As in Smith
v. Murray, the result was a sharply split Court74 and the execution of an
individual whose constitutional rights were apparently violated during
his sentencing trial.75
Aubrey Adams was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in
1978, in a proceeding that involved the trial court judge's constantly ad-
monishing the jury that its decision as to penalty was strictly advisory
and that the trial court was ultimately responsible for the penalty deter-
65. Smith, 477 U.S. at 551 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 538-39.
67. Id. at 535-36. The Court held that neither the attorney's error nor the claim's novelty
established cause for failing to raise the issue in the appeal. Id. Further, the Court refused to
hold that Smith's appellate counsel had been ineffective, judging that the decision not to raise
the claim on appeal, while obviously wrong in retrospect, was viable at the time. Id. at 534-36.
68. Id. at 538.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice
Stevens' dissent, with Justice Brennan joining in part. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition,
Justice Brennan wrote his own dissenting opinion, jointly responding to Smith v. Murray and
Murray v. Carrier, and was joined by Justice Marshall. Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1986, § A, at 29, col. 2.
72. 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
73. Id. at 1214 (White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, JJ. & Rehnquist, C.J., majority opin-
ion), 1218 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1212.
75. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1986, § A, at 29, col. 2.
November 1989] THE NEW ARBITRARINESS
mination.76 No objection to these admonitions was made at trial or on
appeal." On June 11, 1985, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided Caldwell v. Mississippi.7 8 In Caldwell, the Court overturned a
death sentence because the prosecutor had argued to the jury that the
ultimate sentencing decision was not its responsibility, and that its ver-
dict would be reviewed by various courts.79
Adams subsequently brought a state post-conviction relief petition
claiming Caldwell error, but the Florida Supreme Court refused to ad-
dress the merits, finding that the failure to raise the challenge on appeal
constituted a forfeiture.8 0 In the federal habeas proceeding, Adams at-
tacked the adequacy of this state-law forfeiture on grounds that the Flor-
ida courts did not regularly and consistently follow the procedural rule
invoked in his case." The Supreme Court of the United States held,
however, that these cases were insufficient to undercut the adequacy of
the Florida procedural rule. 2
Although Caldwell had not been decided at the time of the trial and
appeal, the Adams Court held that the claim was not so novel as to pro-
vide "cause" since an objection could have been made under existing
state law.83 The Court's resolution of the "fundamental miscarriage of
justice" exception was marked by surprising brevity and a dearth of
analysis.8 4 Justice White, the author of the majority opinion, repeated
76. Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1213.
77. Id. at 1213-14.
78. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
79. Id. at 328-29. The Caldwell Court concluded that "it is constitutionally impermissible
to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe
that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests else-
where." Id. Such an insulation of the capital-sentencing decision was found to violate the
reliability requirements of the eighth amendment. Id. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring
opinion stressing that the prosecutor's comments mischaracterized state law. Id. at 341-43
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The Caldwell decision reflected a split court with a five-justice
majority. 472 U.S. at 322 (Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., majority
opinion), 343 (Rehnquist and White, JJ. and Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Justice Powell took no
part in the decision).
80. Adams v. State, 484 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (1986), cert. denied sub nom. Dugger v. Adams,
475 U.S. 1103 (1986).
81. In support of this point, Adams gathered a number of decisions in which the Florida
Supreme Court had ignored this procedural bar and had addressed Caldwell claims in a similar
posture. See Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1220-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1217 n.6.
The cases in which the state court failed to apply the procedural bar include Daugherty v.
State, 533 So. 2d 287, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 402 (1988); Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853
(1988); Mann v. State, 482 So. 2d 1360 (1986); and Darden v. State, 475 So. 2d 217 (1985).
82. Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1217 n.6.
83. Id. at 1216.
84. In dissent, Justice Blackmun not only disagreed with the majority's substantive con-
clusions but voiced objection to dismissive and "conclusory" treatment of the issues in the
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the Court's earlier concession in Smith v. Murray that the "actual inno-
cence" definition of the "miscarriage of justice" exception is difficult to
apply in a sentencing context." However, he declined to provide gui-
dance for the resolution of this quandary, choosing instead to reject out-
right the seemingly sensible standard presented by the four-justice dissent
that "a fundamental miscarriage results whenever there is a substantial
claim that the constitutional violation undermined the accuracy of the
sentencing decision." 86 Presumably, as with many other contours of the
Sykes approach, a fuller explanation of the "miscarriage of justice" ex-
ception in the capital penalty context awaits another day. Aubrey Ad-
ams was executed by the state of Florida on May 5, 1989.87
Anyone concerned with the fairness of the application of the death
penalty in this country and the integrity of the judicial system cannot
view the results in Smith v. Murray and Dugger v. Adams without some
discomfort. Both cases resulted in an execution where the death sen-
tence, the Court assumed, was the product of an unconstitutional pro-
ceeding. Yet, in the interest of finality and comity, the Court allowed
these executions to proceed, deferring to the severe forfeiture rules of the
state courts.
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE SYKES APPROACH
Not only does the Wainwright v. Sykes88 approach lead to the harsh
results exemplified by Smith v. Murray89 and Dugger v. Adams,90 but its
entire structure crumbles under close analysis. Unfortunately, as Justice
Stevens expressed in his Smith v. Murray dissent, the Court may well
have "lost its way in a procedural maze of its own creation." 91 The con-
tinued adherence to the rules that form this maze is neither wise nor
necessary. As discussed below, the Sykes independent and adequate state
grounds application is flawed by an illogical doctrinal derivation, vague
and undefined terminology, rules of application that contradict its sup-
opinion. Id. at 1225 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I would have expected that when this Court
reinstates a death sentence ... it would be particularly careful to consider fully all issues
necessary to its disposition of the case. To judge by... the Court's opinion, this expectation
was naive.").
85. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
86. Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1219 & n.4.
87. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1989, § A, at 16, col. 1. In contrast, Bobby Caldwell, whose
sentence was reversed in the Caldwell case, was retried and sentenced to life in prison. Cald-
well v. State, 517 So. 2d 1360 (1987).
88. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
89. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
90. 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
91. Smith, 477 U.S. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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posed rationales, and fundamental incompatibility with the entire basis
for the writ of habeas corpus.
The initial problem with the Sykes approach is that it is derived
from a concept of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of the
United States has long held that "it will not consider an issue of federal
law on direct review from a judgment of a state court if that judgment
rests on a state-law ground that is both 'independent' of the merits of the
federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's decision." 92 This
rule reflects the Court's obligation to avoid advisory opinions and refrain
from deciding moot issues: if the state court judgment rests on an in-
dependent ground, the resolution of the federal question is not necessary
to the resolution of the case.93 In contrast, federal habeas jurisdiction is
concerned with whether the confinement is constitutional. 94 A habeas
court is not reviewing the judgment of the state courts; it is reviewing
whether the state authorities' asserted grounds for a confinement and
sentence meet the standards of the Constitution.95 The denial of a consti-
tutional right in a criminal proceeding should not cease to be the basis of
the resulting unconstitutional confinement or sentence when the state
court refuses to cure the injustice because of some procedural flaw in the
presentation of the challenge.
96
The Court has recognized the logical slippage involved in applying a
rule fashioned from appellate jurisdiction in this context 97 but has none-
theless continued to use the Sykes approach because, unlike the use of the
adequate and independent state grounds doctrine in the direct review
context, the state ground is technically not a bar to jurisdiction but only
92. See, eg., Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989) (citing Fox Film Corp. v.
Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36
(1875)).
93. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429 (1963); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
94. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-92 (1969); Fay, 372 U.S. at 399-414; Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963). See also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
95. Fay, 372 U.S. at 430-31. As Justice Brennan explained in Fay: "The jurisdictional
prerequisite [to habeas corpus] is not the judgment of a state court but detention simplic-
iter... Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty; when that right is denied and a
person confined, the federal court has the power to release him. Indeed, it has no other power;
it cannot revise the state court judgment; it can act only on the body of the petitioner." Id.
96. Id. at 426-31.
97. This recognition has come from both ideological poles. In his dissent in Harris v.
Reed, Justice Kennedy protested the "mechanical application of the doctrines governing our
appellate jurisdiction," favoring even greater deference to state court forfeitures. Harris, 109
S. Ct. at 1053 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan made this same point in Fay in
response to the argument that the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine should be
applied to limit the ability of a federal court to cure unconstitutional confinements. Fay, 372
U.S. at 429-31.
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a guidepost for discretion. 98 The discretionary basis of the Sykes restric-
tion adds to the difficulty of its application. A level of inconsistency is
inherent in any discretionary rule.
This inconsistency is exacerbated greatly by the terms the Court has
used to define the doctrine. The "cause-and-prejudice" exception is not
only ill-defined,99 but it is, like the entire approach, derived from an ap-
pellate review context only marginally applicable to the principles of
habeas jurisdiction."c Likewise, the "fundamental miscarriage of jus-
tice" exception is manifestly difficult to apply consistently and further
hampered by the Court's failure to define more explicitly its application
to death penalty cases.1' Thus, the supposed standards for channeling
the habeas court's discretion are set by vague terms without defined sub-
stantive content. Still worse, the Court's application of these standards,
such as the holding that the futility of an objection cannot alone com-
prise "cause,"" seems flatly inconsistent with the purported rationales
underlying the Sykes approach.'013
Ultimately, such an approach is fundamentally incompatible with
the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. The entire concept of the writ
is to provide the judiciary with the power to bypass procedural blockades
and inquire into the fundamental questions of the fairness of the confine-
ment or sentence." ° Procedural obstacles are the very antithesis of the
98. Federal habeas jurisdiction includes the power to sweep aside any state procedural bar
to vindicate constitutional rights. Smith, 477 U.S. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Reed v.
Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984); Sykes, 433 U.S. at 100 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538 (1976).
99. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. As Professor Robbins noted in observ-
ing the lack of development of the "cause-and-prejudice" exception between the Sykes opinion
of 1977 and the Murray v. Carrier opinion of 1986: "Many days had come and gone until the
1985 term, and still we did not really know what cause was." Robbins, supra note 5, at 278.
100. The "cause-and-prejudice" standard was derived from the objection requirements
promulgated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b). See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 84 (1977) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2)); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241
(1973)(citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2)); see also supra note 27.
101. See Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1218 n.6.
102. Smith, 477 U.S. at 535 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982)).
103. In the cases applying Sykes, the Court has held that federalism requires a certain def-
erence to the state court's position as the "primary authority for defining and enforcing the
criminal law." See, eg., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). The Engle Court noted that
federal "intrusions" frustrate state courts' "good-faith attempts to honor constitutional
rights." Id. See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986). Allowing futility as an
exception to the procedural default bar would not interfere with state court decisions or offend
concepts of federalism. Rather, the command implicit in Smith, that litigants must continu-
ally raise futile objections and challenges in state courts in order to preserve them for federal
habeas, is a much greater intrusion into the practices of the state court. See Smith, 477 U.S. at
535.
104. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969).
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Great Writ's purpose and power. As Justice Holmes wrote: "[Habeas
corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure.
It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings...
[and] opens the inquiry. ... "',-5
Given the manifest problems with the Sykes approach both in its
derivation and in its application, it is useful to inquire whether it fulfills
its stated goals. Courts have allowed state procedural defaults to restrict
federal habeas review based on the following rationales: federalism, °6
finality, 107 and the cost of society's "right to punish admitted
offenders."10
Federalism involves both a mutual respect between state and federal
courts for their separate spheres of jurisdiction and a dialectical develop-
ment in their interchange in areas such as the enforcement of federal
constitutional rights.' 0 9 In the Sykes context, "[t]he basis for these re-
strictive waiver rules ... is federal respect for 'the state's interest in the
integrity of its rules and proceedings and the finality of its
judgments.' "110
It is not readily apparent, however, why the federal courts should
grant deference to this state interest. Federal habeas jurisdiction is by
definition a mandate to correct the state court's errors; 11 the "integrity"
of state proceedings must necessarily bow to the inquiry. Further, the
Sykes approach entails a critical and thorough assessment of the state
forfeiture rules and a strict analysis of their purpose, consistency and
application. 12 A simpler rule, bypassing the state forfeiture rules and
going straight to the federal concern of whether the confinement is un-
constitutional under federal standards, might well intrude less upon the
state system and serve federalism better.
1 1 3
105. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
106. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 487; Ross, 468 U.S. at 10; Engle, 456 U.S. at 128; Sykes, 433 U.S.
at 88.
107. Smith, 477 U.S. at 533; Ross, 468 U.S. at 10-11.
108. Engle, 456 U.S. at 127.
109. See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
YALE L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977).
110. O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1, 11 (1985) (quoting
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
111. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
113. The federalism rationale is also apparent in the Court's concern for the purposes un-
derlying state forfeiture rules and its admonitions that federal courts should be loath to allow
litigants to circumvent procedural rules. See Ross, 468 U.S. at 10-11; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88.
As a reason for the harsh results of the Sykes approach, however, this concern is also uncon-
vincing. To the extent a litigant has deliberately bypassed the state requirements, the Fay
system is sufficient to mandate respect for the state rules. See supra notes 20-24 and accompa-
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Finality can be a desirable goal, but the type and cost of finality
must be considered. Finality was undoubtedly served by the executions
of Aubrey Adams and Michael Smith. But the cost in fairness, consis-
tency and integrity seems a high price." 4 Finality might be better served
by avoiding the skirmishes over procedural default and pursuing a sim-
pler and more direct route to a final adjudication of the merits of the
constitutional claim.
The third general rationale for restricting the reach of federal habeas
underlying the Sykes approach concerns the "social cost" of interfering
with "the right to punish" offenders." 5 In Engle v. Isaac,"6 Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion noted that "[p]assage of time, erosion of
memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even
impossible."1 In response, Justice Brennan noted that it was unfair to
punish a defendant by upholding an unconstitutional conviction because
of the "logistical and temporal difficulties" of retrial."' While these op-
posing views reflect subjective value differences and cannot be easily re-
solved, a recognition of this social cost can be fully reconciled with the
abandonment of the Sykes restrictions. As with almost all constitutional
rights, the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus involves costs to
society. Yet this recognition does not entail the conclusion that our judi-
cial system should undercut this right. Rather, it entails a corresponding
recognition that the protection of essential liberties is not accomplished
without sacrifice.
The application of Sykes has failed to make any clear contribution to
fairness or the desirable interests of federalism. While the Sykes ap-
proach certainly favors a type of finality of criminal judgments and re-
stricts the vindication of constitutional rights, such outcomes seem at
odds with the constitutional and statutory mandate of the habeas guaran-
tee.'19 Even assuming a marginal benefit to some legitimate judicial in-
terest could be achieved through deference to state forfeiture rules, the
nying text for a discussion of Fay. To the extent a state forfeiture rule operates to trap the
defendant in an unconstitutional confinement, respect for the underlying purpose of such a
rule would seem to fall to the mandate of habeas jurisdiction.
114. See supra notes 50-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Adams and Smith.
115. Engle, 456 U.S. at 127.
116. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
117. Id. at 127-28. Dissenting in Vasquez v. Hillary, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, echoed these sentiments and expressed the view that the diffi-
culty of retrial should be an affirmative consideration in assessing whether habeas relief should
be granted at all. 474 U.S. 254, 279-82 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
118. Engle, 456 U.S. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
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problematic methodology of the Court's approach is crippling. 120 The
fundamental unfairness of executing Aubrey Adams while Bobby Cald-
well was sentenced to life at his retrial'21 is the legacy of Sykes.
V. SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION
When Justice Stewart voted to hold the death penalty system uncon-
stitutional in violation of the eighth amendment in Furman v. Georgia,22
he pointed out that "[t]hese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the
same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual" and con-
cluded that the arbitrary, "wanton and freakish" imposition of this pen-
alty was unacceptable. 2 ' Four years later, authoring the plurality
opinion of Gregg v. Georgia 24 that effectively reinstated the death pen-
alty in the United States, Justice Stewart upheld the new Georgia statute
because, he concluded, it adequately provided guidance to prevent the
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. 125
Furman, Gregg, and much of the Court's capital jurisprudence
since, were concerned with the arbitrariness in the selection of those sen-
tenced to death, and the Court took steps to correct this flaw. 126 In con-
tradiction of this goal, Smith v. Murray27 and Dugger v. Adams 28
introduced a whole new level of arbitrariness: having actual executions
turn on whether the defendant was unlucky enough to have a lawyer who
120. Justice Stevens has bemoaned "the Court's preoccupation with procedural hurdles."
Engle, 456 U.S. at 136 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Brennan has consistently argued that
the Sykes standard is "misguided and insupportable in any context." Id. at 151 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 522-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Sykes, 433 U.S. at
108-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Even Justice Kennedy has criticized the logical flaws in the
Sykes approach. See Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1048-56 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
121. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
122. 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
123. Id.
124. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
125. Id. at 195.
126. The constitutional requirement that a capital sentencing process rationally and reliably
select those most deserving of the extreme sentence, explicated in Furman and Gregg, underlies
a number of subsequent decisions. In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), the Court
struck down a capital sentence because the sentencer had relied on a sentencing report that
contained information undisclosed to the defendant. Id. at 351-62. In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420 (1980), and Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988), the Court held that vague
and arbitrarily applied statutory aggravating circumstances were unconstitutional. Godfrey,
446 U.S. at 428-29; Maynard, 108 S. Ct. at 1859. In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987),
and Gathers v. South Carolina, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989), the Court held that a death sentence
could not be based on information concerning the victim that was not linked to the defendant's
personal moral culpability. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504; Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210.
127. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
128. 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
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failed to make the appropriate objection at the appropriate time. 129
The freakish and wanton execution of individuals because their at-
torneys failed to raise a challenge at the proper procedural hour, or be-
cause the attorney failed to press futile objections, thus stands in sharp
contrast to the requirements the Court has placed on state legislatures,
130
trial courts,1 31 and prosecutors. 132 It is one matter to recognize, as the
Court did in McCleskey v. Kemp,1 33 that a certain level of inconsistency
must be accepted in a system that uses human beings as prosecutors and
jury members.13 1 It is quite another to introduce into the system a new
layer of arbitrariness.
Escape from the procedural maze is not difficult. Two possible exits
are already available. First, since the entire Wainwright v. Sykes 135 doc-
trine rests on a discretionary restriction of federal habeas review,"36 an
exception for capital cases would be perfectly consistent with the Court's
view that death as a penalty is different in kind and requires heightened
regard for consistency and reliability. 137 A similar approach has been
adopted in many state courts that have review procedures for challenges
in death penalty cases despite procedural forfeitures.
1 38
129. See supra notes 50-87 and accompanying text.
130. For example, the Court has held that a state's capital sentencing statute must provide
guidance to ensure that the sentencing discretion is "suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 874 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Court
insists that the state has an obligation to impose capital sentences "fairly with reasonable con-
sistency or not at all." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982). Furthermore, the
Court has held that statutory terminology must identify specific factual criteria to "justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder." See Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; see also Maynard, 108 S. Ct. at 1858.
131. The Court has held that in addition to the general requirements of eighth amendment
jurisprudence, trial courts must limit evidence of aggravation to factors directly related to the
"moral culpability" and "blameworthiness of a particular defendant." South Carolina v.
Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2210 (1989); Booth, 482 U.S. at 504. The Court requires that a trial
court be prepared to sweep aside technical adherence to state evidentiary rules if application
would lead to the exclusion of reliable and crucial mitigating evidence. Skipper v. South Caro-
lina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
132. For example, the Court overturned one death sentence on the basis of a misleading
prosecutorial argument. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
133. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
134. Id. at 311.
135. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
136. Id. at 78-82.
137. See Catz, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: The Need for a Preclusion
Doctrine Exception, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1177, 1214-18 (1985); Meltzer, State Court Forfei-
ture of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1222 (1986).
138. Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Smith, "the prevailing practice in many States"
of recognizing "a special duty in capital cases to overlook procedural defaults and review the
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A second approach would be the reworking of the Sykes approach
along the lines suggested by Justice Stevens' dissent in Smith v. Mur-
ray.13 9 The central goal of federal habeas jurisdiction should be the cor-
rection of fundamental injustice. Thus, by making the "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" criteria an exception to the default rule and nar-
rowly construing it in terms of actual innocence, the Court has obscured
the more appropriate inquiry."4 Relief from a death sentence should be
available when a constitutional violation effects the accuracy of the sen-
tencing determination, whatever the procedural posture of the claim.
Thus, technical errors would be vulnerable to a default rule, but constitu-
tional violations that go to the fairness of the sentencing trial and the
reliability of the result could be corrected by the federal courts.
Either approach would result in the elimination of hypertechnical
barriers to habeas relief and refocus on the proper inquiry of whether the
conviction and sentence were attained in conformity with constitutional
protections. This new focus would benefit both litigants and the courts
by reducing the time and effort devoted to litigating side issues such as
"adequacy," "independence" and "cause and prejudice."
The writ of habeas corpus is "the fundamental instrument for safe-
guarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state ac-
tion."' 41 Twenty years ago, the Court explained that:
The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all
manner of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers
of forms and procedural mazes-have always been emphasized
and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very na-
ture of the writ demands that it be administered with the initia-
tive and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice
within its reach are surfaced and corrected. 142
The misguided adherence to a rule which defaults legitimate consti-
tutional claims, lost in state court through no fault of the petitioner, and
results in a post-conviction lottery as disturbing as any standardless trial
proceeding represents an abrupt departure from the noble tradition of the
writ of habeas corpus. At a time when the courts, both state and federal,
are experiencing great pressure to expedite capital cases, there is a great
trial record for reversible error, before affirming that most severe of all sentences." Smith, 477
U.S. at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 544-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 544-45; Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1224 n.15 (1989) (Blackmun J.,
dissenting).
141. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969).
142. Id. at 291.
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risk that the undeserving and the innocent will be executed in an ill-
conceived rush to reduce the perceived "backlog" in death sentence
cases. Now is not the time to tie the Great Writ in a series of procedural
bindings, but to restore it to its true and noble position as an instrument
of justice.
